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Abstract – As a solution to protect and defend a system against inside attacks, 
many intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been developed to identify and react 
to them for protecting a system. However, the core idea of an IDS is a reactive 
mechanism in nature even though it detects intrusions which have already been in 
the system. Hence, the reactive mechanisms would be way behind and not effective 
for the actions taken by agile and smart attackers. Due to the inherent limitation of 
an IDS with the reactive nature, intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) have been 
developed to thwart potential attackers and/or mitigate the impact of the intrusions 
before they penetrate into the system. In this chapter, we introduce an integrated 
defense mechanism to achieve intrusion prevention in a software-defined Internet-
of-Things (IoT) network by leveraging the technologies of cyberdeception (i.e., a 
decoy system) and moving target defense, namely MTD (i.e., network topology 
shuffling). In addition, we validate their effectiveness and efficiency based on the 
devised graphical security model (GSM)-based evaluation framework. To develop 
an adaptive, proactive intrusion prevention mechanism, we employed fitness 
functions based on the genetic algorithm in order to identify an optimal network 
topology where a network topology can be shuffled based on the detected level of 
the system vulnerability. Our simulation results show that GA-based shuffling 
schemes outperform random shuffling schemes in terms of the number of attack 
paths toward decoy targets. In addition, we observe that there exists a tradeoff 
between the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure) and the defense 
cost introduced by the proposed MTD technique for fixed and adaptive shuffling 
schemes. That is, a fixed GA-based shuffling can achieve higher MTTSF with more 
cost while an adaptive GA-based shuffling obtains less MTTSF with less cost. 
10.1 Introduction 
Internet-of-Things (IoT) has received significant attention due to their enormous 
advantages. Advances in IoT technologies can be easily leveraged to maximize 
effective service provisions to users. However, due to the high heterogeneity and 
the constrained resources of composed entities, and its large-scale networks, we 
face the following challenges [23]: (1) distributed technologies for 
communications, data filtering, processing, and dissemination with an enormous 
amount of various forms of data (e.g., text, voice, haptics, image, video) in large-
scale networks with heterogeneous entities (i.e., devices, humans); (2) severely 
restricted resources in battery, computation, communication (e.g., bandwidth), and 
storage, causing significant challenges in resource allocation and data processing 
capabilities; (3) highly adversarial environments, introducing compromised, 
deceptive entities and data, which may result in detrimental impacts on the 
capabilities of critical mission-related decision making; and (4) highly dynamic 
interactions between individual entities, data, and environmental factors (e.g., 
network topology or resource availability), where each factor is highly dynamic in 
time/space. Due to these characteristics of IoT environments, highly secure, 
lightweight defense mechanisms are in need to protect and defend a system (or 
network) against potential attacks. 
As a solution to protect and defend a system against inside attacks, many intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs) have been developed to identify and react to the attacks. 
However, the core idea of an IDS is reactive in nature and even though it detects 
intrusions which have already been in the system. Hence, this reactive mechanism 
would be way behind and not effective for the actions by agile and smart attackers. 
Due to the inherent limitation of an IDS with these reactive nature, intrusion 
prevention systems (IPSs) have been developed to thwart potential attackers and/or 
mitigate the impact of the intrusions before they penetrate into the system [5]. In 
this work, we are interested in developing an integrated intrusion prevention 
mechanism based on the technologies of cyberdeception (i.e., a decoy system) and 
moving target defense, namely MTD (i.e., network topology shuffling), and 
evaluating their effectiveness and efficiency by a graphical security model (GSM)-
based evaluation framework. 
10.1.1 Research Goal & Contributions 
This work aims to propose an integrated proactive defense based on intrusion 
preventive mechanisms, such as cyberdeception and MTD techniques, to minimize 
the impact of potential attackers trying to penetrate into IoT systems via multiple 
entries. We make the following key contributions in this book chapter: 
 We developed an integrated proactive defense system by proposing an adaptive 
MTD technique by shuffling a network topology where a network consists of 
both decoy nodes and real nodes. As decoy nodes are the part of a decoy system, 
which is a common cyberdeception technology, this work integrates an MTD 
technique with cyberdeception to propose an adaptive, proactive intrusion 
defense mechanism that maximizes hurdles and/or complexity for attackers to 
launch their attacks while minimizing the defense cost to execute MTD 
operations. The key goal of the proposed network topology shuffling-based 
MTD (NTS-MTD) with decoy nodes is to generate a network topology that can 
maximize disadvantages against the attackers. Little work has integrated both 
cyberdeception and MTD techniques particularly in terms of network topology 
shuffling in software-defined networking (SDN)-based IoT environments. 
 We took a metaheuristic approach based on a genetic algorithm (GA) by 
devising fitness functions that can achieve the objective of our proposed 
proactive defense mechanism in terms of minimizing defense cost as well as 
security vulnerability in attack paths. For example, given a set of network 
topologies that are uniformly selected at random, we use the GA and devise 
fitness functions that identify an optimal network topology to minimize security 
vulnerability and defense cost (e.g., network shuffling cost). In particular, the 
devised fitness functions estimate the utility of triggering NTS-MTD operation 
based on a generated network topology in an adaptive way, instead of triggering 
the MTD operation based on a fixed time interval. This allows our proposed 
integrated defense mechanism to provide a secure, affordable defense service.  
 We considered a SDN-based IoT as our network environment. The merits of 
SDN technology in terms of programmability and controllability are highly 
leveraged to design the proposed proactive defense mechanism equipped with 
MTD and cyberdeception techniques and examine its performance in terms of 
security and performance metrics, including the number of attack paths towards 
decoy targets, mean time to security failure (i.e., MTTSF or system lifetime), 
and defense cost. 
 We adopted a graphical security model, namely GSM [14], [12], to evaluate the 
proposed deception and MTD techniques. The GSM offers design solutions to 
consider attack graphs (AGs) and/or attack trees (ATs) which can provide 
efficient methods to calculate the potential security (or vulnerability) levels of 
attack paths. In order to deal with large-scale networks, we will develop a 
Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (HARM) [12], [14] as a GSM 
model. The HARM allows us to evaluate the proposed proactive mechanisms 
including both the cyberdeception and MTD techniques. 
 
10.1.2 Structure of This Chapter 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 provides the brief 
overview of the related work in terms of MTD and cyberdeception techniques for 
IoT environments, security models and metrics, and SDN technology and its use 
for IoT environments. Section 10.3 gives the overview of the system model, 
including models of describing a targeted network environment, node 
characteristics, attack behaviors, and defense mechanisms in place and security 
failure conditions. Section 10.4 describes the design features of the proposed 
integrated proactive defense mechanism in terms of NTS-MTD, optimization 
techniques for NTS-MTD based on GA, and GSM for NTS-MTD in IoT 
environments. Section 10.5 shows the experimental results and discusses the 
overall trends of the results observed. Section 10.6 concludes this chapter and 
suggests future work directions. 
10.2 Related Work 
In this section, we provide the overview of the state-of-the-art approaches with the 
topics as the basis of the proposed work, including: (1) MTD and cyberdeception 
techniques for IoT; (2) security models and metrics; and (3) SDN technology for 
IoT. 
10.2.1 MTD and Cyberdeception Techniques for IoT 
Moving target defense (MTD) is an emerging technique aiming at constantly 
changing the attack surface of the networks to increase the attack complexity [14]. 
Based on [14], MTD approaches are classified into three categories: shuffling, 
diversity and redundancy. Shuffling changes the network configurations (e.g., IP 
address randomization, device migration, or topology reconfiguration). Diversity 
employs a variety of different implementations for the same functionalities (e.g., 
choosing various operating systems for the web server). Redundancy provides 
replications of the devices in the network to increase network reliability in the 
presence of attacks. 
MTD approaches have been proposed to protect resource-constrained IoT devices. 
In our prior work [12], we examined the performance of address space layout 
randomization (ASLR) for wireless sensor nodes as an MTD technique and 
evaluated its effectiveness using the proposed HARM in one of the use cases. 
Casola et al. [4] proposed an MTD framework to reconfigure the IoT devices by 
switching among different cryptosystems and firmwares, and then evaluated the 
framework via a case study of wireless sensor networks. Two metrics, attack 
probability and attack time, are used to assess the effectiveness of the 
reconfiguration; but there is still a lack of system-level metrics to quantify the 
proposed approach. Sherburne et al. [27] proposed a dynamically changing IPv6 
address assignment approach over the IoT devices using Low-Powered Wireless 
Personal Area Networks (LPWPANs) protocol to defend against various network 
attacks. Zeitz et al. [30] extended [27] and presented a design of fully implementing 
and testing the MTD approach, which uses the address rotation to obscure the 
communications among IoT devices. However, both works [27], [30] do not have 
any experimental validation of the design. Mahmood et al. [19] developed an MTD 
security framework based on context-aware code partitioning and code 
diversification for IoT devices to obfuscate the attackers; but it also does not 
perform any analysis to validate the framework.  
Cyberdeception techniques are proactive approaches in cyber defense which add 
an extra layer of defense onto the traditional security solutions (e.g., Intrusion 
Detection System, or IDS, firewalls, or endpoint anti-virus software). Once 
attackers are inside a network, they start probing to acquire information to 
determine the potential valuable assets and then move laterally in the network to 
launch attacks based on the information they gather during the probes. Cyber 
deception aims at luring the attackers into the decoy systems within the network 
and interacting with the attackers to monitor and analyze attackers’ behaviors. 
Honeypot is one of the commonly used technologies in cyberdeception. It is created 
as a fake asset and deployed around the valuable assets to divert attackers. 
However, the management complexity and scalability issues of the honeypots 
hinder the wide usage by the enterprises. Modern deception technology uses basic 
honeypot technology along with visualization and automation techniques [20]. It 
allows distributed deployment and update of decoy systems to achieve adequate 
coverage but still cost-effective. 
The state-of-the-art approaches in this domain have focused on developing and 
deploying honeypot technology for IoT. La et al. [16] introduced a game theoretic 
method to model the interaction between an attacker who can deceive the defender 
with suspicious or seemingly normal traffic and a defender in honeypot-enabled 
IoT networks. Anirudh et al. [2] used honeypots for online servers to mitigate 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks launched from IoT devices. Dowling 
et al. [8] created a ZigBee honeypot to capture attacks and used it to identify the 
DDoS attacks and bot malware. However, none of the work analyzed the impact of 
the deception techniques on the system-level security. Besides, little study analyzed 
the modern deception technology for an IoT system which allows distributed 
deployment and the update of decoys to achieve adequate coverage and provide 
cost-effective defense service [22]. 
In our prior work [5], we looked into an integrated defense system to identify what 
components of each defense mechanism can provide a best solution for achieving 
“defense in breadth” considering both enhanced security and defense cost. 
However, it is purely a model-based analysis based on an abstract model in which 
a granularity of each defense mechanism is omitted to capture a system-level 
performance to some extent. In addition, there is no current work on developing an 
integrated defense system equipped with two proposed defense techniques in an 
IoT, including deception and MTD techniques. Therefore, this work proposes 
integrated and proactive defense mechanisms that can effectively and efficiently 
mitigate the adverse effect of attackers before the attackers penetrate into a target 
IoT system. 
10.2.2 Security Models and Metrics 
Graphical security models (attack graphs (AGs) [28], attack trees (ATs) [25]) 
have been widely employed for security analysis in various types of networks and 
combined with security metrics to evaluate different defense mechanisms. In the 
graph-based attack models, an AG shows all possible sequences of the attackers’ 
actions that eventually reach the target. With the increasing size of the network, 
calculation of a complete AG has exponential complexity, thus causing a scalability 
issue. In the tree-based attack models, an AT is a tree with nodes representing the 
attacks and the root representing the goal of attacks. It systematically presents 
potential attacks in the network. However, an AT also has the scalability issue when 
the size of the network increases. In order to address the above issues, the two-
layered HARM [14] was introduced, which combines various graphical security 
models onto different layers. In the two-layered HARM, the upper layer captures 
the network reachability information and the lower layer represents the 
vulnerability information of each node in the network. The layers of the HARM 
can be constructed independently of each other. This decreases the computational 
complexity of calculating and evaluating the HARM compared with the calculation 
and evaluation of the existing single-layered graphical security models. 
In our prior works [12], [14], we investigated the effectiveness of defense 
mechanisms based on the GSM, particularly using HARM. In [12], we developed 
a framework to automate the security analysis of the IoT system in which HARM 
along with various security metrics (e.g., attack cost, attack impact) is used to assess 
the effectiveness of both device-level and network-level defense mechanisms in 
three scenarios. Similarly, in [14], we evaluated the proposed MTD techniques in a 
virtualized system based on HARM with a risk metric; but we analyzed the 
performance of three different MTD techniques, including shuffling, diversity and 
redundancy, separately while leaving the investigation of an integrated defense 
system as the future work, which is studied in this work. 
Some existing approaches have adopted a risk-based or vulnerability-based security 
model to assess the effectiveness of defense mechanisms [1], [24], [26]. Abie and 
Balasingham [1] proposed a risk-based security framework for IoT environments 
in the eHealth domain to measure expected risk and/or potential benefits by taking 
a game theoretic approach and context-aware techniques. Savola et al. [26] 
proposed an adaptive security management scheme considering security metrics 
(e.g., metrics representing authentication effectiveness, authorization metrics) to 
deal with the challenges in eHealth IoT environments. However, both works [1], 
[26] only proposed high-level ideas about the metrics without any formulation and 
did not consider the key characteristics of IoT environments where lightweight 
defense mechanisms are vital to securing a large-scale, resource-constrained IoT 
system. Rullo et al. [24] proposed an approach to compute the optimal security 
resource allocation plan for an IoT network consisting of mobile nodes and 
introduced a risk metric inspired by economics to evaluate the allocation plans. 
However, it only considered the device-level mechanisms and did not show the 
system-level evaluation. 
Unlike the existing approaches above [1], [24], [26], we proposed a lightweight, 
affordable method to evaluate the deployment of an integrated defense mechanism 
for an IoT environment by meeting both security and performance goals of a 
system. 
10.2.3 SDN Technology for IoT 
Software defined network (SDN) is a promising technology to flexibly manage 
complex networks. In the SDN-based architecture, the control logic is decoupled 
from the switches and routers and implemented in a logically centralized controller; 
the controller communicates with the data forwarding devices via the southbound 
application programming interface (API) and provides the programmability of 
network applications using the northbound API. OpenFlow (OF) is the most widely 
used southbound API which provides the specifications for the implementation of 
OF switches (including the OF ports, tables, channel and protocol) [31].  
Some SDN solutions are applied to IoT networks to control data flows among IoT 
devices [7] while others focused on applying an SDN to wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) for managing sensing devices [10]. Trevizan de Oliveira et al. [7] designed 
and implemented an SDN architecture consisting of SDN-enabled sensor nodes and 
one or multiple controllers in a TinyOS environment. Galluccio et al. [10] proposed 
a stateful SDN solution for WSNs to reduce the amount of exchanged data between 
the sensor nodes and the SDN controller and to enable a variety of operations that 
are not supported by stateless solutions. Some SDN approaches were proposed in 
heterogeneous wireless networks, such as wireless access networks [17] or mobile 
networks [3], to manage end-to-end flows. On the other hand, other approaches 
provided a software-defined IoT architecture for managing IoT devices in different 
application domains, e.g., SD-IoT architecture for smart urban sensing in [18]. 
Current SDN solutions show the feasibility to control traffics within IoT networks 
by dynamically updating forwarding rules in either switches or SD end devices [9]. 
This feature could be utilized by network-level defense mechanisms to improve the 
response time, which can better deal with potential security issues arising from IoT 
networks. In our prior work [13], we designed a topology reconfiguration method 
for the SD WSNs with non-patchable vulnerabilities to change the attack surface of 
the network in order to increase the attack complexity. In this work, we consider a 
general IoT network with the support of SDN functionality for the network 
topology shuffling where an IoT network consists of both decoy and real nodes. 
10.3 System Model 
We discuss our system model in terms of (1) the network model based on SDN 
technology for IoT environments; (2) the attack model describing attack behaviors 
considered in this work; and (3) the defense model addressing defense mechanisms 
placed in the given network. 
10.3.1 Network Model 
In this work, we concern an IoT environment consisting of servers and IoT nodes. 
In a given IoT environment, nodes gather data and periodically deliver them to the 
servers via single or multiple hop(s) for further processing to provide a queried 
service. IoT nodes of different types/functionalities are placed in different Virtual 
Local Area Networks (VLANs) in the given network. Servers are also deployed in 
a separate VLAN within the network. We assume that each VLAN has a certain 
number of IoT nodes with similar types regarding their functionalities. 
In this work, we leverage the SDN technology [7], [10], [11], [17] in order to 
effectively and efficiently manage and control nodes in an IoT network. There 
exists an SDN controller placed in a remote server. The SDN controller 
communicates with the SDN switches. The servers and IoT nodes in the IoT 
network are connected to the SDN switches. The SDN controller manages the flows 
between IoT nodes and servers.  
10.3.2 Node Model 
In a given network, we characterize a node’s attributes in terms of four aspects: (1) 
whether a node is compromised or not (i.e., 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑐 = 1 for compromised; 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑐 = 0 
otherwise); (2) whether a node is a real node or a decoy node (i.e., 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑑 = 1 for a 
decoy; 𝑛𝑖. 𝑑 = 0  otherwise); (3) whether a node is a critical node that has 
confidential information where the information should not be leaked out to 
unauthorized parties (i.e., 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑟 = 1 for a critical node; 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑟 = 0 otherwise); and (4) 
a list of vulnerabilities that a node contains (i.e., 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑣 = {𝑣1, ⋯ , 𝑣𝑚} where 𝑚 is 
the total number of vulnerabilities). Hence, node 𝑖’s attributes are represented by: 
𝐴𝑛𝑖 = [𝑛𝑖 . 𝑐, 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑑, 𝑛𝑖. 𝑟, 𝑛𝑖. 𝑣] (10.1) 
10.3.3 Attack Model 
In this work, we consider the following attacks that may lead to breaching system 
security goals: 
 
Fig. 10.1: Example of a software-defined IoT network. 
 Reconnaissance attacks: Outside attackers can perform scanning attacks in 
order to identify vulnerable targets (e.g., a server) to break into a system (or a 
network). If this attack is successful, the outside attacker successfully identifies 
the vulnerable target and compromises it. This attack success leads to the loss 
of system integrity because the system has its system component compromised 
as well as the attacker from the outside. The success of this attack type is related 
to triggering the system failure based on the security failure condition 1 (SFC1), 
explained in Section 10.3.5. 
 Data exfiltration attacks: After an outside attacker becomes an inside, 
legitimate attacker by using the credentials (e.g., login credentials or a 
legitimate key to access the system / network resources) obtained from the 
compromised, target node, it can leak confidential information out to 
unauthorized, outside parties. If this attack is successful, this results in the loss 
of confidentiality because confidential information to be only shared by 
legitimate users is leaked out to the unauthorized party. When this attack is 
successful, it will lead to the security failure based on SFC2 in Section 10.3.5. 
In this work, the following attack behaviors are assumed to characterize the 
considered attackers: 
 An attacker is assumed to have limited knowledge on whether a given node is 
decoy (i.e., a fake node mimicking a real, normal node) or not. The attacker’s 
capability to detect the deception depends on the knowledge gap between the 
attacker and the real system state or how effectively the developed decoy 
system mimics the real system in a sophisticated manner. For simplicity, we use 
the probability of an attacker interacting with a decoy to represent the level of 
the attacker’s intelligence in detecting a decoy node, as described in Section 
10.3.4. 
 After the attacker interacts with a decoy, the attacker’s behavior is monitored. 
If the attacker realizes that the node with which it interacted is a decoy, it 
terminates the interactions with the decoy node immediately and attempts to 
find a new target to get into the system. 
 An attacker’s ultimate goal is to compromise the servers to leak the confidential 
information to unauthorized entities outside the IoT network. 
 An attacker is capable of identifying exploitable, unpatched vulnerabilities or 
unknown vulnerabilities and compromising the vulnerable IoT nodes in a given 
IoT network.  
 It is hard for the attacker to compromise the servers directly as each server has 
strong protection mechanisms. Thus, the attacker is able to exploit vulnerable 
IoT nodes as entry points. Once the attacker breaks into the network by using 
IoT nodes, it can move laterally within the network and eventually compromise 
the servers by identifying and exploiting unpatched or unknown vulnerabilities. 
 The SDN controller is well-protected where the communications between the 
SDN controller and the SDN switches are assumed to be secure [11]. 
10.3.4 Defense Model 
We assume that traditional defense mechanisms are in place on the IoT network, 
including a network-based IDS, firewalls, and anti-virus software on the servers. 
The IDS is capable of monitoring the whole IoT network and creates alerts once an 
intrusion is being detected for incident response. In addition, we have two types of 
intrusion prevention mechanisms in place, cyberdeception and MTD, to 
dynamically change the attack surface of the IoT network so that they can make 
attackers hard to launch their attacks, resulting in high attack complexity. 
 
 
10.3.4.1 Decoy System as Defensive Cyberdeception 
This defense mechanism allows defenders to capture and analyze malicious 
behaviors by luring attackers into a decoy system within a given network and 
interacting with the attackers. The decoy system is deployed independently from 
the real system. Accordingly, we assume that normal, legitimate users are not aware 
of the existence of the decoy system while the defenders will only get alerts caused 
by the malicious intrusions if an attacker breaks into the decoy system. 
We consider two types of decoys utilized throughout an IoT network considered in 
this work: 
 Emulation-based decoys: This type of decoys allows defenders to create a 
variety of fake assets and to provide a large-scale coverage across the network.  
 Full OS-based decoys: This type of decoys enables the replication of actual 
production devices to increase the possibility that the attacker engages the 
decoys and exposes its intention and/or strategy.  
Both emulation-based and full OS-based decoys can be autonomously created to fit 
within the environment with no changes to the existing infrastructure. They can 
provide various types of interactive capabilities. To increase the overall chances of 
accessing decoys by attackers, the decoys can be created by combining multiple, 
diverse forms of decoys that look like real, legitimate nodes. In addition, the decoys 
can be deployed in every VLAN of the network. Besides, there exists an 
intelligence center performing the following tasks: (1) create, deploy, and update a 
distributed decoy system; (2) provide automated attack analysis, vulnerability 
assessment, and forensic reporting; and (3) integrate the decoy system with other 
prevention systems (e.g., security incident and event management platform, 
firewalls) to block attacks. The module for the decoy node deployment can be 
implemented and placed in a remote server. 
For these two types of decoy nodes to be considered in this work, we create a design 
parameter, 𝑃𝑑, indicating the probability that an attacker interacts with a decoy node. 
Since full-OS-based decoys are considered as having more sophisticated, real-node 
like quality with more cost, we consider 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 as the probability that the attacker 
interacts with an emulation-based decoy while using  𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆 as the probability based 
on the assumption that the attacker will more likely to interact with an OS-based 
decoy with 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 ≤ 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆. 
10.3.4.2 Network Topology Shuffling-based MTD 
In this work, we consider Network Topology Shuffling-based MTD, namely NTS-
MTD, to change the topology of the given IoT network where the network consists 
of both real, legitimate nodes and decoy nodes. NTS-MTD is to be triggered 
following the concept of event-based MTD in that the network topology changes 
upon a certain event indicating that the network is at risk due to too many nodes 
being compromised. For example, following the concept of Byzantine Failure [11], 
if the system is close to a security failure state, such as more than one third of nodes 
being compromised, the network topology is being shuffled in order to stop or 
mitigate the spread of nodes being compromised.  
In this work, we assume that the SDN controller can control the traffic of the decoy 
nodes in an SDN-based decoy system and manage to change the network topology 
upon a certain event. We combine the cyberdeception and NTS-MTD and propose 
a network topology shuffling with decoy nodes to change the attack surface of the 
IoT network. The details of the proposed decoy system and the NTS-MTD are 
described in Section 10.4. 
10.3.5 Security Failure Conditions 
A system fails when either of the below two conditions is met: 
 Security Failure Condition 1 (SFC1): This system failure is closely related to 
the attacker’s successful reconnaissance attacks and accordingly their 
successful compromise of system components (or capture of IoT nodes). We 
define this system failure based on the concept of Byzantine Failure [11]. That 
is, when more than one third of legitimate, member nodes are compromised, we 
define it as the system failure due to the loss of system integrity. 
 Security Failure Condition 2 (SFC2): This system failure occurs when 
confidential information is leaked out to unauthorized parties by inside 
attackers (or compromised nodes), which perform the so called data exfiltration 
attack. This type of system failure occurs due to the loss of data confidentiality. 
10.4 Proposed Proactive Defense Mechanisms 
In this section, we provide the overview of our proposed NTS-MTD in terms of the 
decoy-based network topology shuffling, optimization method, and graphical 
security model for security analysis.  
10.4.1 Network Topology Shuffling with Decoy Nodes 
In this section, we describe the details of the proposed NTS-MTD in terms of how 
to deploy the initial set of nodes, how to select a network topology to be shuffled, 
and when to shuffle a network topology. 
10.4.1.1 Initial Deployment of Nodes 
We consider both servers and IoT node decoys to be deployed in the IoT network. 
As the network is divided into different VLANs, a certain number of decoy nodes 
can be placed into each VLAN based on the real nodes placed to the corresponding 
VLAN. At least one decoy server needs to be deployed to interact with the attacker 
and reveal the attacker’s intent. We distribute the IoT decoy nodes into each VLAN 
based on the deployment of real nodes in the VLAN. Note that we can deploy more 
decoys if the VLAN has a large number of real nodes with different types. When 
adding the decoy nodes, we link real IoT nodes with the decoy nodes to lure 
attackers into the decoy system. The flows from the real IoT nodes to the decoy 
nodes or from the decoy nodes to the decoy nodes are controlled by the SDN 
controller. There will be no flows from decoy nodes to real nodes as the decoy 
nodes are used to divert the attackers from the real system; once the attacker is lured 
into the decoy system, it will be diverted to other decoys within the decoy system 
and the behavior will be monitored; if the attacker finds out a node it interacted 
with is a decoy node, it will terminate the interaction with the decoy node and look 
for a new target to break in. The directional flows between real and decoy nodes 
may reveal some information to the attackers in the long term. We will consider 
changing flows from real nodes to real nodes in the future work to increase the 
complexity of the connection changes. 
We assume that newly added flows will not affect normal flows from the IoT nodes 
to servers for the service delivery. In practice, the IoT nodes will consume more 
energy to deliver more flows and may delay the time to send normal packets 
towards the server. Thus, the service availability provided by the server may be 
affected. This will be examined in our future work. 
10.4.1.2 Selection of a Network Topology to Shuffle 
Given the IoT network with real nodes, we first decide the number of decoys to be 
potentially deployed in each VLAN and then randomly generate a set of 
deployments of the decoy nodes with added connections to some randomly chosen 
real nodes. The set of these randomly generated network topologies will be used as 
the initial set of topologies and they will be used in the shuffling optimization 
algorithm to identify an optimal network topology. 
10.4.1.3 Adaptive Shuffling of a Network Topology as an MTD 
As a baseline MTD, we can simply choose a fixed time interval to be used to 
execute a given MTD mechanism. Alternatively, we can design an intelligent MTD 
to be executed in an adaptive manner based on the system security level detected 
by the defender. For example, a network topology needs to be changed when the 
defender perceives the system security vulnerability level larger than a given 
threshold 𝜌. The system security vulnerability level at time 𝑡, denoted by 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡), 
is measured by two dimensions: (1) how many legitimate, inside nodes are 
compromised until time 𝑡, associated with SFC1; and (2) how many neighboring 
nodes of a critical node (i.e., 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑟 = 1) within 𝑘 hops from the critical node 𝑖 are 
compromised until time 𝑡, which is related to detecting SFC2. Note that when the 
system meets either SFC1 or SFC2, then the system fails, leading to 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) = 1. 
Otherwise, 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) is computed by: 
𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) = 𝑤1
𝐶𝑁(𝑡)
𝑁
+ 𝑤2
𝐶𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡)
𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡)
 
(10.2) 
Here 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are weights to consider SFC1 and SFC2, respectively, where 𝑤1 +
𝑤2 = 1. 𝑁 is the total number of real nodes initially deployed and 𝐶𝑁(𝑡) is the 
number of compromised, real nodes at time 𝑡. 𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) is the total number of real 
nodes within 𝑘 hops from given critical nodes at time 𝑡 while 𝐶𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) is the total 
number of compromised, real nodes among the real nodes within the 𝑘 hops from 
the given critical nodes. Since there may be multiple critical nodes which have 
confidential information that should not be leaked out to outside, non-authorized 
nodes, we estimate 𝐶𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) by: 
𝐶𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑛𝑖. 𝑐
𝑖∈𝐿𝑘(𝑡)
(𝑡) (10.3) 
where 𝐿𝑘(𝑡) means the number of real nodes that belong to neighbors of any critical 
nodes within 𝑘 hops from them at time 𝑡. Recall that 𝑛𝑖 . 𝑐(𝑡) refers to whether node 
𝑖 is compromised (𝑛𝑖 . 𝑐(𝑡) = 1) or not (𝑛𝑖. 𝑐(𝑡) = 0) at time 𝑡. Thus, the cardinality 
of 𝐿𝑘(𝑡) (i.e., |𝐿𝑘(𝑡)|) is the same as 𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡). Note that as a network topology keeps 
changing due to executing the MTD to change the network topology, both 𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) 
and 𝐶𝑁𝑐𝑘(𝑡) are the functions of time to reflect their dynamic changes. Note that 
the set 𝐿𝑘(𝑡) may include any critical nodes being compromised. If this happens, it 
means the system meets SFC2 and the system failed. That is, 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) = 1 and no 
further detection of system security level is needed.   
For each 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡), we calculate the mean time to compromise (MTTC) associated 
with it. MTTC refers to the total amount of time that the attacker takes to 
compromise a series of nodes within the network until the system reaches a certain 
security vulnerability level. The computation of MTTC is detailed in Section 10.5.3. 
10.4.2 Genetic Algorithm-based Network Shuffling Optimization 
In this section, we discuss a GA-based network shuffling optimization technique in 
a given SDN-based IoT network. 
To breach system security goals, an attacker may be able to find multiple attack 
paths to reach a target node via one or multiple entry points. An attack path specifies 
a sequence of nodes that the attacker can compromise to reach the target node. We 
consider a set of attack paths 𝐴𝑃 for the attacker to reach all the targets from all 
possible entry points. Each attack path 𝑎𝑝 is a sequence of nodes over the attack 
path. We use 𝐴𝑃𝑟 to represent a set of attack paths with real nodes as targets and 
𝐴𝑃𝑑 to indicate a set of attack paths with decoy nodes as targets. 𝐴𝑃𝑟 only contains 
the real nodes while 𝐴𝑃𝑑 contains both real nodes and decoy nodes. To be specific, 
in the attack model, we assume the attacker could exploit any IoT nodes as entry 
points. Once the attacker successfully compromises a node, it could use this node 
as the stepping stone to compromise other nodes and further compromise servers 
as their targets. The attacker may find a real node as the entry point and then is 
diverted to a decoy node. Once the attacker is lured into the decoy system, it will 
be diverted to other decoy nodes within the decoy system. If the attacker reaches 
the decoy server, this is accounted as an attack path in 𝐴𝑃𝑑 ; but if the attacker 
figures out the decoy node and terminates its interaction with the decoy node, this 
is not counted as an attack path because the attacker does not reach the decoy server 
(i.e., target). Besides, the decoy nodes could be easily updated or cleared once being 
compromised via the central management portal thus the attacker will not recognize 
the same decoy node during the subsequent attacks. 
We design three metrics to be optimized: (1) the number of attack paths towards 
the decoy targets (𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃); (2) mean time to security failure (MTTSF); and (3) defense 
cost (𝐶𝐷). The computations of these metrics are described in Section 10.5.2. 
10.4.3 Graphical Security Model for the IoT MTD 
We apply the graphical security model to assess the security of an SDN-based IoT 
network with the proposed proactive defense mechanism. Fig. 10.2 describes the 
workflow consisting of network generation, topology generation, security model 
generation, shuffling mechanism evaluation, and shuffling optimization.  
 
Fig. 10.2: Workflow for security analysis. 
The workflow of this security analysis consists of the following five phases: 
 Phase 1: The security decision maker provides the IoT Generator with the 
system information (i.e., an initial network topology and node vulnerability) to 
construct an IoT network.  
 Phase 2: Given the network and initial deployment of the decoys, the Topology 
Generator randomly generates a set of different topologies (i.e., add 
connections from real nodes to decoys) based on the shuffling algorithm. Each 
shuffling is presented in an integer format and passed onto the Optimization 
Module. Phase 3: The Security Model Generator takes the shuffled network 
as input and automatically generates the HARM which captures all possible 
attack paths. We use the three-layered HARM [14], [15] as our graphical 
security model. In the three-layered HARM, the upper layer captures the subnet 
reachability information, the middle layer represents the node connectivity 
information (i.e., nodes connected in the topological structure), and the lower 
layer denotes the vulnerability information of each node.  
 Phase 4: The Shuffling Evaluator takes the HARM as input along with the 
evaluation metrics and computes the results which are then fed into the 
Optimization Module.  
 Phase 5: Based on the initial set of shuffled topologies and the associated 
evaluation results, the Optimization Module applies the multi-objective 
genetic algorithm to compute the optimal topology for the IoT network based 
on the termination conditions (e.g., the maximum number of generations 
defined by the security decision maker). 
10.5 Numerical Results & Analysis 
In this section, we describe our experimental setup and simulation results, along 
with the analysis of the observed trends from the obtained results. 
10.5.1 Experimental Setup 
We use the example SD-IoT network shown in Fig. 10.1. Specifically, the network 
consists of four VLANs. There are two Internet of Medical Things (i.e., MRI and 
CT Scan) in 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁1 , a smart thermostat, a smart meter and a smart camera in 
𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁2, a smart TV and a laptop in 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁3 and a server located in 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁4. 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁4 
is connected with other three VLANs as IoT devices need to deliver information to 
the server for further processing. 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁2  is also connected to 𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑁3  for the 
applications on smart TV and laptop to control the smart sensors as well as 
receiving videos from the smart camera.  
For the software vulnerability analysis, we will be using Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVE) / National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21] for IoT 
networks. We assume each real node has one vulnerability that could be exploited 
by the attacker to gain a root privilege. More vulnerabilities could be chosen for the 
nodes in the future work as the focus of the research is to propose and evaluate the 
proactive defense mechanism, rather than demonstrating the capabilities of the 
graphical security model to analyze the security posture of the IoT network with 
multiple vulnerabilities. The vulnerability information of real nodes (i.e., CVE ID) 
are assumed following Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Real node and vulnerability information. 
Real Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate 
MRI VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006 
CT Scan VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006 
Smart 
Thermostat 
VLAN2 CVE-2018-11315 
0.006 
Smart Meter VLAN2 CVE-2017-9944 0.042 
Smart Camera VLAN2 CVE-2018-10660 0.042 
Smart TV VLAN3 CVE-2018-4094 0.012 
Laptop VLAN3 CVE-2018-8345 0.004 
Server VLAN4 CVE-2018-8273 0.006 
Table 10.2: Decoy node and vulnerability information. 
Decoy Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate 
CT Scan VLAN1 
CVE-2018-8308 0.006 
CVE-2018-8136 0.012 
Smart Camera VLAN2 
CVE-2018-6294 0.042 
CVE-2018-6295 0.042 
CVE-2018-6297 0.042 
Smart TV VLAN3 
CVE-2018-4094 0.012 
CVE-2018-4095 0.012 
Server VLAN4 
CVE-2016-1930 0.042 
CVE-2016-1935 0.012 
CVE-2016-1962 0.042 
We also assume the compromise rate of each vulnerability. The compromise rate 
represents the frequency that an attacker could successfully exploit the vulnerability 
to gain root privilege per time unit (i.e., hour). We estimate the value according to 
the base score from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). 
Specifically, we estimate the compromise rate as once per day (i.e., 0.042) if the 
base score is 10.0, twice per week (i.e., 0.012) with the base score of around 8.0, 
once per week (0.006) when the base score is around 7.0 and once per 10 days (i.e., 
0.004) under the score of around 5.0. This value will be used to calculate MTTSF 
and MTTC in the simulations based on the HARM. 
We consider using one type of decoys in each VLAN in the initial deployment of 
the decoy system. In order to lure the attackers, each decoy is assumed to be 
configured to have multiple vulnerabilities. The attacker could exploit any 
vulnerability to gain the root permission of the node. We assume to use the 
vulnerabilities of the decoys based on Table 10.2. 
10.5.2 Metrics 
We use the following metrics to measure security and performance of the proposed 
proactive defense mechanism: 
 Number of attack paths towards decoy targets (𝑵𝑫𝑵
𝑨𝑷 ): This metric indicates 
the level of deception that diverts the attacker from the real system. 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃  is 
calculated by |𝐴𝑃𝑑| to sum the attack paths towards the decoy targets.  
 Mean Time To Security Failure (MTTSF): This metric measures the system 
lifetime indicating how long the system prolongs until the system reaches either 
SFC1 or SFC2 (described in Section 10.3.5). That is, this measures the system 
uptime without occurring any security failure. MTTSF is measured by: 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹 = ∑(1 − 𝑆𝐹𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑆
∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 
(10.4) 
where 𝑆 is a set of all system states and 𝑆𝐹𝑖 returns 1 when system state 𝑖 reaches 
either SFC1 or SFC2; 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) indicates the probability that the system is 
at system state 𝑖. 
 Mean Time To Compromise (MTTC): This metric refers to the total amount 
of time that the attacker takes to compromise a series of nodes within the 
network until the system reaches a certain security vulnerability level, 𝑆𝑆𝑉. 
This metric is used to detect the system security vulnerability level upon the 
number of nodes being compromised by the attacker and employed to determine 
when to trigger an MTD operation. Similar to the computation of MTTSF as 
above, MTTC is estimated by: 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐶 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑖∈𝑆
∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 
(10.5) 
where 𝑆 refers to a set of all system states that do not reach the given 𝑆𝑆𝑉 and 𝑆𝑖 
returns 1 when system state 𝑖  didn’t reach the 𝑆𝑆𝑉 ; 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)  is the 
probability of the system being at system state 𝑖. 
 Defense Cost (𝑪𝑫): This metric captures the cost associated with the shuffling 
operations. That is, we count the number of edges shuffled (i.e., from connected 
to disconnected or from disconnected to connected) by: 
𝐶𝐷 = ∫ 𝐶𝑆(𝑡)
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹
𝑡=0
 
(10.6) 
where 𝐶𝑆(𝑡) refers to the number of shuffled edges at time 𝑡. Note that a same edge 
can be shuffled multiple times over time and each shuffling is counted as a separate 
MTD operation during the system uptime. 
10.5.3 Comparing Schemes 
We have two aspects of MTD to investigate: (i) when to shuffle a network topology; 
and (ii) how to select the network topology. As described in Section 10.4.2, (i) is to 
investigate an interval or when to execute the proposed MTD operation in an 
adaptive manner while (ii) is to investigate the effect of a selected network topology 
generated by a GA-based network topology or a random network topology. 
The two types of ‘when to shuffle a network topology’ strategies are: 
 Fixed Shuffling (FS): This shuffling represents a baseline scheme using a fixed 
time interval to shuffle a given network topology. 
 Adaptive Shuffling (AS): This shuffling is designed to execute the MTD in an 
adaptive manner based on the system security vulnerability level (𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡)), 
detected by the defender with two given thresholds: (1) 𝛽 to check the decrease 
of the 𝑆𝑆𝑉 during the time Δ; and (2) 𝜌 to check the current system security 
vulnerability, 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) , as described in Section 10.4.1. The NTS-MTD is 
executed if the condition, (𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡 − Δ) > 𝛽) ∧ (𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) < 𝜌), is met 
where Δ is a checking interval. 
The two types of ‘how to select a network topology’ strategies are: 
 Random Network Topology (RNT): This scheme is used as a baseline model 
that can simply select a network topology based on a simple random selection 
of a node’s edges to other nodes based on a rewiring probability 𝑃𝑟  which 
represents the probability that a node is connected with another node in a given 
network. Here 𝑃𝑟  is critical in determining the overall network density in a 
given network. 
 GA-based Network Topology (GANT): This scheme selects a network 
topology based on the method proposed in Section 10.4.1. That is, a network 
topology to be used for a next round of shuffling is selected based on the 
network topology that maximizes the objective functions used in the GA, as 
discussed in Section 10.4.1. 
Since we have two strategies under each category of the proposed MTD 
mechanisms, we investigate the following four schemes as follows: 
 FS-RNT: This scheme executes the NTS-MTD based on a certain fixed time 
interval, 𝛾, with a selection of a random network topology based on RNT.  
 AS-RNT: This scheme adaptively executes the NTS-MTD based on the level 
of system security vulnerability, 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡), detected by the defender selecting a 
random network topology based on RNT. 
 FS-GANT: This scheme changes a current network topology to a selected 
network topology based on the decision of the fitness functions using GA and 
executes the NTS-MTD based on a certain fixed time interval.  
 AS-GANT: This scheme adaptively changes a network topology based on the 
system security vulnerability level, 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡) , detected by the defender and 
selects a network topology to change based on the decision of the fitness 
functions using GA. 
10.5.4 Simulation Steps and Parameter Details 
We implement the simulations based on the workflow shown in Figure 10.2. The 
Shuffling Evaluator could be either a GA-based shuffling algorithm or a 
random shuffling algorithm.  
We consider MTTSF as an expected mean MTTSF, 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), in computing the 
shuffled network topology based on the assumptions of the potential attacker (See 
Section 10.3.3). For each shuffled network, we construct HARM and calculate 
potential attack paths. We assume that the attacker randomly selects one entry point 
and compromises the nodes on the attack path at each time until either security 
failure condition (see Section 10.3.5) is met. We assume the defender will clear the 
decoy nodes once it detects the attacker’s interaction with the decoy target. 
Therefore, the attacker will not recognize the same decoy node during its following 
action. The attacker’s intelligence, estimated by the probability to interact with the 
decoy, 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆(see Section 10.3.4) is incorporated into the calculation of the 
expected mean MTTSF, 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), as well as actual MTTC in adaptive shuffling. 
We consider the defender’s error probabilities in estimating the attacker’s 
interaction probability with a decoy with the ranges of [−0.05, 0.05]. This affects 
the defender’s ability to estimate 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )  because the defender needs to 
compute the actual MTTC based on its detection probability, 𝛼 = 0.95  (i.e., a 
defender’s confidence about the attacker’s intelligence). The detailed calculation 
steps for these two metrics are found in [12]. As the entry points are randomly 
chosen, we run the attacker model for 100 times and calculate 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) from the 
HARM for the given shuffled network.  
In GANT, we encode each shuffling solution for the whole network as a binary 
valued vector where 1 represents the existence of an edge between two nodes (i.e., 
two nodes are connected) while 0 represents no edges (i.e., two nodes are not 
connected). We limit the potential connections to be the edges from real IoT nodes 
to decoy nodes. Hence, to optimize the defense cost, we aim to maximize 𝐶𝑇(𝑡) −
𝐶𝐷(𝑡) where 𝐶𝑇(𝑡) refers to the total defense cost that counts the total number of 
potential changes of the edges at time 𝑡 while 𝐶𝐷(𝑡) is the number of edges changed 
by the used NTS-MTD (see Section 10.5.2) at time 𝑡. Here we aim to solve a multi-
objective optimization (MOO) problem with three objectives to maximize 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃 
and 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )  while minimizing 𝐶𝐷  (or maximizing 𝐶𝑇(𝑡) − 𝐶𝐷(𝑡) ). The 
optimization problem is to compute a set of Pareto optimal solutions (or Pareto 
frontier) [6]. In order to choose one optimal solution among the Pareto frontier, we 
first normalize the three metrics, denoted by 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴?̃?, 𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )̃ , and  𝐶?̃?,  and assign 
a weight for each metric based on scalarization-based MOO technique to make the 
MOO problem to a single-objective optimization (SOO) problem [6], respectively. 
The metric is normalized by: 
?̃? =  
𝑋
𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
(10.7) 
where ?̃? is the normalized metric value, 𝑋 is the original metric value, and 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 is 
the maximum metric value of the corresponding fitness function among the final 
population in the GA-based algorithm. 
The objective function we aim to maximize is represented by: 
max  𝑤𝑁𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴?̃?+𝑤𝑀𝐸(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
̃ 𝑤𝐶𝐶?̃? (10.8) 
where 𝑤𝑁, 𝑤𝑀 and 𝑤𝐶 are weights for each metric with 𝑤𝑁 + 𝑤𝑀 + 𝑤𝐶 = 1. The 
optimal solution is the network topology with the maximum objective value.  
In this study, we consider an equal weight for 𝑤𝑁,𝑤𝑀 and 𝑤𝐶, respectively, with 
1.0/3.0.  
We assume the following algorithm parameters for the simulations with GANT: 
population size (𝑁) = 100, maximum number of generations (𝑁𝑔) = 100, crossover 
rate (𝑟𝑐) = 0.8 and mutation rate (𝑟𝑚) = 0.2. In RNT, we randomly change the edges 
between the real IoT nodes and decoy nodes. We also considered the probability 
that an edge will be shuffled (i.e., add/remove an edge) with 𝑃𝑟 = 0.5. 
When calculating 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡)  for adaptive shuffling, we use the following default 
values for the weights (𝑤1, 𝑤2), two 𝑆𝑆𝑉 related thresholds to execute the NTS-
MTD (β and 𝜌) and the 𝑘 number of hops to determine the neighbor nodes to a 
critical node: 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 0.5  , β = 0.01 , 𝜌 = 0.1  and 𝑘 = 1 . The checking 
interval Δ is determined upon detecting a compromised node by the defender.  
 
 
Table 10.3: Design parameters, their meanings, and the default values. 
Parameter Meaning Default 
Value 
𝑁 The total number of network topologies with initial decoy 
deployment and randomly generated connections between 
real and decoy nodes  
100 
𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃 The number of attack paths towards the decoy targets Metric 
MTTSF Mean time to security failure, representing the system 
lifetime 
Metric 
MTTC Mean time to compromise a fraction of nodes in a network 
until the system reaches a certain security vulnerability 
level 
Metric 
𝐶𝐷 The number of edges changed from a previous network 
topology to a current network topology due to the network 
shuffling-based MTD 
Metric 
𝑤𝑁 A weight to consider 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃 1/3 
𝑤𝑀 A weight to consider MTTSF 1/3 
𝑤𝐶 A weight to consider 𝐶𝐷 1/3 
𝑤1 A weight to consider the security vulnerability associated 
with SFC1 
0.5 
𝑤2 A weight to consider the security vulnerability associated 
with SFC2 
0.5 
𝑁𝑔 The maximum number of the generation used in GANT 100 
𝑟𝑐 Crossover rate used in GANT 0.8 
𝑟𝑚 Mutation rate used in GANT 0.2 
𝑃𝑟 The probability of an edge being shuffled 0.5 
β The threshold used to estimate the decrease of the system 
security vulnerability level during the time Δ  used in 
GANT 
0.01 
𝜌 The threshold of tolerating system security vulnerability 
used in GANT 
0.1 
𝑘 The number of hops to determine a node’s ego network 1 
𝛾 The fixed shuffling time interval used in RNT (hour) 24 
Whenever the defender detects a compromised real node, it will check whether the 
system reaches the given 𝑆𝑆𝑉(𝑡), reflecting the nature of an event-driven adaptive 
MTD. 
We assume there is an attacker during each simulation run. The attacker randomly 
chooses entry points and compromises nodes along the attack paths with the 
behaviors defined in Section 10.3.3. By using the fixed shuffling schemes, the 
network may be shuffled while a node is under attacks. We assume the attacker is 
forced to quit the network due to lost connections and needs to find other ways to 
break into the network.  During the subsequent attack after shuffling, the attacker 
could continue its previous attack action once it encounters the same real node next 
time (i.e., MTTC for the real node is accumulated throughout the MTTSF). By 
using the adaptive shuffling schemes, the network is shuffled due to the system 
security vulnerability level detected by the defender. The attacker is also forced to 
quit the network after each shuffling due to lost connections and needs to find ways 
to re-enter the network. For both schemes, the decoy node is cleared at each 
shuffling. 
For each simulation, we calculate actual MTTSF under the existence of real 
attackers, average 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃 , denoted as  𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , by summing 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃  from each shuffled 
network and dividing it by the total number of shuffling times within MTTSF, and 
defense cost per time unit,  𝐶?̂?, by summing 𝐶𝐷 from each shuffling network and 
dividing it by actual MTTSF.  
We run the entire simulation for 100 times and calculate the average metric value 
by summing the metric value from each simulation and dividing the summed value 
by the total number of simulations. We use 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  and 𝐶?̂?
̅̅̅̅  to represent the 
mean metric value in our experimental results shown in the following section. Table 
10.3 summarizes the design parameters, their meanings, and corresponding default 
values used in our simulation experiments. 
10.5.5 Simulation Results 
In our simulation experiments, we consider three scenarios by varying the number 
of decoys in each VLAN and the level of attackers’ intelligence in detecting decoy 
nodes (i.e., 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚  and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆): (1) one decoy node assigned for each VLAN in the 
presence of low-intelligent attackers (i.e., 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 = 0.9  and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆 = 1.0 ); (2) one 
decoy node assigned for each VLAN in the presence of medium-intelligent 
attackers (i.e., 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 = 0.5 and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆 = 0.9); and (3) two decoy nodes assigned for 
each VLAN in the presence of low-intelligent attackers (i.e., 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 = 0.9 and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆 =
1.0). For other key design parameters, we will follow default values summarized in 
Table 10.3. 
10.5.5.1 One Decoy Node for Each VLAN with Low-Intelligent Attackers 
Fig. 10.3 shows how the considered four MTD schemes perform in terms of mean 
values of the three metrics described in Section 10.5.2 over 100 simulations. In Fig. 
10.3 (a), with the random shuffling, both FS-RNT and GA-RNT have a similar 
number of attack paths towards decoy targets, 29; with the GA-based shuffling, 
𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  is much higher with 54 for both schemes. 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  is determined by the network 
topology; thus, either random shuffling or GA-based schemes have a similar 
performance in 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ . 
Fig. 10.3 (b) shows the values of the average MTTSF. With FS, both schemes have 
higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  compared with AS schemes based on the following reason. A node 
may still be under attacks while the network is shuffled because the fixed interval 
is much smaller than MTTC for the node. However, the attacker is forced to quit 
the network due to lost connections and needs to re-enter the network by randomly 
choosing entry points to compromise.   
  
(a) Average number of attack paths 
towards decoy targets (𝑵𝑫𝑻
𝑨𝑷̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  ) 
(b) Average MTTSF (𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑭̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
 
(c) Average defense cost per time unit (𝑪?̂?
̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
Fig. 10.3: Performance comparison of the four MTD schemes with low-
intelligent attackers where one decoy node is deployed for each VLAN. 
During the subsequent attack after each shuffling, the attacker could continue its 
previous attack action once it encounters the same real node next time (i.e., MTTC 
for the real node is accumulated throughout MTTSF).  After then, the attacker needs 
to launch a new attack for decoys as they are cleared at each shuffling. However, 
although MTTC is accumulated for the real node, the time to meet either security 
failure condition (i.e., compromise a certain number of nodes or the critical node) 
increases over time. In addition, FS-GANT has higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (i.e., 1,381 hours) 
than that of FS-RNT (i.e., 1131 hours) while AS-GANT also has slightly higher 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  than that of AS-RNT, showing 782 and 817 hours, respectively.  
Now we investigate the effect of the four schemes in terms of the average defense 
cost per time unit which shows the tradeoff for defense cost per time unit and 
MTTSF. Fig. 10.3 (c) shows the average defense cost per time unit 𝐶?̂?
̅̅̅̅  under the 
four schemes. As expected, FS-RNT scheme incurs the highest cost (i.e., 0.59) due 
to frequent executions of network shuffling while AS-GANT has the lowest cost 
(i.e., 0.05). Surprisingly, FS-GANT incurs less cost than AS-RNT with 0.11 and 
0.13, respectively. This is due to less edge changes of GA-based scheme in each 
shuffling even if the network topology changes at a fixed interval.  
Overall, GA-based schemes can preserve a higher security level in terms of 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃 
and maintaining a lower cost while fixed shuffling-based schemes incur higher 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We can see there is a balance between MTTSF and defense cost per time 
unit. 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of FS-GANT is roughly 1.7 times higher than 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of AS-GANT 
while 𝐶?̂?
̅̅̅̅  of FS-GANT is twice of that of AS-GANT. 
10.5.5.2 One Decoy Node for Each VLAN with Medium-Intelligent Attacker  
We use the same initial decoy deployment in Section 10.5.5.1, except considering 
medium-intelligent attackers with 𝑃𝑑
𝑒𝑚 = 0.5  and 𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑆 = 0.9 . For other design 
parameters, we follow their default values summarized in Table 10.3.  
Fig. 10.4 shows the performance of the four schemes in terms of the mean value of 
each metric in Section 10.5.2 based on 100 simulation runs when the attackers have 
the medium-intelligent levels. Fig. 10.4 (a) shows the similar trend observed in Fig. 
10.3 (a). With the random shuffling, both FS-RNT and GA-RNT have a similar 
number of attack paths towards decoy targets which is about 29; for the GA-based 
shuffling, much higher 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  is observed, showing 54 for both schemes.  
Fig. 10.4 (b) shows a similar trend as Fig. 10.3 (b). With FS, both schemes have 
higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  compared with AS schemes. Besides, FS-GANT has higher 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (i.e., 1,414 hours) than FS-RNT (i.e., 1,139 hours) while AS-GANT also 
has slightly higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  than AS-RNT, showing 720 and 766 hours, 
respectively. 
Fig. 10.4 (c) shows the similar trend in Fig. 10.3 (c). As expected, FS-RNT incurs 
the highest cost (i.e., 0.59) among all due to frequent executions of network 
shuffling while AS-GANT has the lowest cost (i.e., 0.05). Surprisingly, FS-GANT 
incurs less cost than AS-RNT, showing 0.1 and 0.14, respectively, due to less edge 
changes of GA-based scheme in each shuffling.  
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Fig. 10.4: Performance comparison of the four MTD schemes with 
medium-intelligent attackers where one decoy is deployed for each VLAN. 
Overall, we observe GA-based schemes can maintain a higher security level in 
terms of 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃 and generate lower cost while fixed shuffling schemes incur higher 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We can also see there is a balance between MTTSF and defense cost per 
time unit. 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of FS-GANT is roughly 1.8 times higher than that of AS-GANT 
while 𝐶?̂?
̅̅̅̅  of FS-GANT is twice of that of AS-GANT. Additionally, fixed shuffling-
based schemes could keep 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  similar under low and medium attack 
intelligence. This is because the fixed interval is much smaller than MTTC for a 
node. Therefore, a node may still be under attacks while the network is shuffled. 
However, the attacker is forced to quit the network and could continue its previous 
attack when encountering the same real node thus causing MTTC for the real node 
being accumulated throughout the MTTSF. Although the attacker’s intelligence 
increases causing shorter MTTC for decoy nodes, the time to meet either security 
failure condition (i.e., compromise a certain number of nodes or the critical node) 
remains similar. For adaptive shuffling-based schemes, 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  with low-
intelligent attackers is slightly higher than that with medium-intelligent attackers. 
This implies that potential attackers with higher intelligence in detecting the decoys 
hurts the system lifetime as measured based on MTTSF under adaptive shuffling. 
However, we prove that AS-GANT is resilient under high-intelligent attacks 
without much reduction of MTTSF when compared with the case with low-
intelligent attacks as shown in Section 10.5.5.1. 
10 5.5.3 Two Decoy Nodes for Each VLAN with Non-Intelligent Attackers 
We use two decoy nodes for each VLAN as the initial deployment. We use the low-
intelligent attackers and follow the default values of other design parameters in 
Table 10.3.  
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Fig. 10.5: Performance comparison of the four MTD schemes with low-
intelligent attackers where two decoy nodes are deployed for each VLAN. 
Fig. 10.5 shows the performance of the four schemes under this scenario (i.e., two 
decoy nodes for each VLAN with low-intelligent attackers) in terms of the mean 
values of three metrics based on the results collected from 100 simulation runs. As 
expected, Fig. 10.5 (a) shows the results similar to what we observed in Fig. 10.3 
(a) and Fig. 4 (a). The random shuffling-based schemes, both FS-RNT and GA-
RNT, have a similar number of attack paths towards decoy targets which is roughly 
52; with the GA-based shuffling, 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  is much higher, showing 85 with FS-GANT 
and 88 with AS-GANT. As more decoys are deployed in the network, all four 
schemes have higher 𝑁𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑃̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  compared with the schemes when only one decoy is 
deployed in each VLAN. 
Fig.10.5 (b) also follows the similar trends to the results shown in Fig. 10.3 (b) and 
Fig. 10.4 (b). With FS, both schemes have higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  compared with AS 
schemes. Besides, FS-GANT scheme has higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (i.e., 1,757 hours) than 
FS-RNT scheme (i.e., 1,423 hours) while AS-GANT scheme also has slightly 
higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  than AS-RNT scheme, demonstrating 809 and 831 hours, 
respectively. Due to more decoys deployed in the network, all four schemes have 
higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  than a single decoy being deployed in each VLAN. 
Fig. 10.5 (c) shows a slightly different trend compared to the results in Fig. 10.3 (c) 
and Fig. 10.4 (c). As expected, FS-RNT incurs the highest cost (i.e., 1.03) among 
all while FS-GANT incurs the second highest cost (i.e., 0.44) due to more frequent 
executions of network shuffling than adaptive shuffling. AS-GANT has the lowest 
cost (i.e., 0.14) among all. As more edges are available to be changed due to the 
increased number of decoy nodes, both FS-RNT and FS-GANT schemes incur 
higher cost than AS counterparts. Due to more connections that could be shuffled 
between decoys and real nodes, all four schemes under two decoys in each VLAN 
incur higher cost than the corresponding schemes under one decoy deployed in each 
VLAN. 
Overall, GA-based schemes can provide a higher security level in terms of 𝑁𝐷𝑁
𝐴𝑃. 
Adaptive shuffling-based schemes incur lower cost while fixed shuffling-based 
schemes incur higher 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We can see there is a balance between MTTSF and 
defense cost per time unit. 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of FS-GANT is roughly 2.1 times higher than 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of AS-GANT while 𝐶?̂?
̅̅̅̅  of FS-GANT is 3.1 times higher than that one of 
AS-GANT. Compared with the results in Section 10.5.5.1, the network with an 
increasing number of decoys has higher security level but requires more cost due 
to a greater number of potential connections for shuffling. 
10.6 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this work, we have proposed an integrated proactive defense mechanism for an 
SDN-based IoT environment based on cyberdeception and MTD to improve 
security and mitigate the impact of potential attacks. More specifically, we have 
developed a network topology-based shuffling (NTS) in a network deployed with 
decoy nodes. We adopted a genetic algorithm (GA) and devised fitness functions 
to consider three system objectives: maximizing security by maximizing a number 
of attack paths towards decoy targets and mean time to security failure while 
minimizing defense cost derived from network topology shuffling operations. We 
also considered adaptive shuffling by introducing a metric to detect the system 
security vulnerability level based on the number of detected, compromised nodes 
and the number of critical nodes being compromised. For the assessment of our 
proposed NTS-MTD, we employed a graphical security model, namely HARM, 
based on the combination of attack graphs and attack trees. Via our extensive 
simulation study, we devised the four schemes considering either adaptive shuffling 
or fixed shuffling to determine when to trigger an MTD operation while answering 
how to trigger an MTD operation by using a random shuffling or GA-based 
intelligent shuffling. We compared the performance of the four schemes under three 
different scenarios by varying the number of decoys and the attacker’s intelligence 
levels in detecting the decoys. Finally, we observed the outperformance of GA-
based shuffling regarding the number of attack paths towards decoy targets and the 
balance between MTTSF and defense cost for fixed and adaptive GA-based 
shuffling schemes under the extensive performance analysis [29].  
In our future work, we plan to explore: (1) how to apply our proposed scheme in 
large-scale IoT networks with a variety of decoy nodes by showing high scalability; 
(2) carrying out sensitivity analysis by varying the values of other key design 
parameters (e.g., weights to consider each system objective, a more number of 
decoy nodes deployed in the network, a more number of attackers, and/or system 
security vulnerability thresholds); (3) investigating the effect of deception and/or 
MTD on service availability, such as delay introduced by the deployment of decoy 
nodes and/or network topology shuffling; and (4) identifying an optimal setting of 
adaptive network topology shuffling algorithms in terms of thresholds in detecting 
system vulnerabilities. 
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